

# Machine Learning in Digital Twins for Threat Estimation and Detection

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# Presentation plan

- Who Am I?
- Let's breakdown Digital Twin
- Digital Twin literature
- Emerging Approaches: From Data-Driven to Model-Aware Digital Twins
  - Reference system modelization
  - Double pipeline ML
- Future Work
- Challenges
- Summary

# Who Am I? — PhD Student, Digital Twins & Cybersecurity

 *PhD Student – IMT Atlantique & UQAC  
(Cotutelle France–Canada)*

 *Member of the Industrial Chair CyberCNI*

 *2nd year PhD – 2024 → 2028*

 *Research Focus: Digital Twins, Machine Learning, Cyber-Physical Systems Security*

My research focuses on leveraging Digital Twins to model system behavior and estimate ongoing or future cyber attacks.

# Who Am I?

## Goals of my thesis

- Goal 1** Modelization of the reference system within the DT.
- Goal 2** Using DTs for simulating side-channel measurements for better attack detection.
- Goal 3** Using DTs for more comprehensive risk analysis.

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
# Let's break down Digital Twin

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
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# Let's break down Digital Twin




**Fig 1:** Digital Twin core principle

# Let's break down Digital Twin



**Fig 2:** Digital Twin architecture

# Let's break down Digital Twin




## 2. Physical system modelization

Represent system's state

Make simulations


**Fig 2:** Digital Twin architecture

# Let's break down Digital Twin



**Fig 2:** Digital Twin architecture

# Let's break down Digital Twin



**Fig 2:** Digital Twin architecture


## 4. Visualization & Decision

Present the results to dashboards

Send command control to the system


# Let's break down Digital Twin

## Digital Twin Consortium Periodic Table



**Fig 3:** Digital Twin consortium periodic table

# Let's break down Digital Twin



**Fig 2:** Digital Twin Architecture

# Digital Twin literature

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# Digital Twin Literature

## Taxonomy application

| Ref | Deployment    | Synchronization | Main role           | security       | Evolution strategy | Learning method | AI/ML Horizon         |
|-----|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| [1] | On-site       | Continuous      | Intrusion detection | detec-<br>tion | Static             | Supervised      | Reactive              |
| [2] | Edge          | Continuous      | Proactive detection | detec-<br>tion | Static             | Supervised      | Short-term estimation |
| [3] | On-site       | Continuous      | Intrusion detection | detec-<br>tion | Static             | Unsupervised    | Reactive              |
| [4] | Hybrid        | Periodic        | Decision support    |                | Static             | Supervised      | Short-term estimation |
| [5] | Cloud         | Continuous      | Intrusion detection | detec-<br>tion | Static             | Semi-supervised | Reactive              |
| [6] | Cloud         | Continuous      | Proactive detection | detec-<br>tion | Static             | Supervised      | Short-term estimation |
| [7] | Edge / Hybrid | Continuous      | Proactive detection | detec-<br>tion | Static             | Unsupervised    | Short-term estimation |
| [8] | Cloud         | Periodic        | Intrusion detection | detec-<br>tion | Static             | Supervised      | Reactive              |

**Fig 4.1:** Positioning of paper using ML with DT within the taxonomy

# Digital Twin Literature

## Taxonomy application

Deployment  
and location

Synchronizatio  
n

Main security  
role

Evolution  
strategy

Learning  
method

ML Horizon

(R.1) Passive Monitoring : Observation and state collection.

(R.2) Intrusion Detection (IDS) : Identification of known/unknown attacks.

(R.3) Proactive Detection (Prediction) : Forecasting attacks before exploitation.

(R.4) Decision Support : Assisting operators in response actions.

(R.5) Post-Incident Analysis (Forensics) : Reconstruction after an attack.

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(E.1) Static (Fixed Model) : Trained once without updates.

(E.2) Incremental : Continuously updated as new data arrives.

(E.3) Federated : Distributed training across multiple DTs or entities.

# Digital Twin Literature

## Taxonomy application

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**Fig 4.2:** Positioning of paper using ML with DT within the taxonomy

# Digital Twin Literature

## Taxonomy application

Deployment  
and location

Synchronizatio  
n

Main security  
role

Evolution  
strategy

Learning  
method

ML Horizon

(H.1) Reactive : Immediate attack detection based on reference system flows.

(H.2) Short-term Estimation : Predicting imminent events such as drifts or anomalies.

(H.3) Long-term Evaluation : Risk analysis and resilience planning.

# Digital Twin Literature


## Taxonomy application

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
**Fig 4.3:** Positioning of paper using ML with DT within the taxonomy

# Digital Twin Literature

## Reference System Models for Cybersecurity



**Fig 5:** Layers of DT architecture applied with ML



**Fig 2:** Layers of DT architecture

# Emerging Approaches: From Data-Driven to Model-Aware Digital Twins


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# Most Digital Twins Only Mirror Data — Not System

## Behavior

Without an explicit model of the reference system, detection stays reactive.




**Fig 6:** Dataflow using ML model

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


**Fig 6:** Dataflow using ML model

# Most Digital Twins Only Mirror Data — Not System

## Behavior


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
**Fig 6:** Dataflow using ML model

# Modelizing the Reference System Enables Proactive Estimation

From observation → to estimation → to anticipation.




**Fig 7:** Known attack pattern



# Modelizing the Reference System Enables Proactive Estimation

From observation → to estimation → to anticipation.




**Fig 8:** Attack estimation

# From Modelization to Learning

System modeling provides the foundation for safe ML training and estimation.


## Pipelines



- Proactive detection with event forecasting
- Allow data validation and coherence based on model on the DT before passing it to the ML pipeline
- Can go even further by passing, settings, parameters, comportement based observation to the ML pipeline
- Allow coupling with physical parameters to enhance the detection

# Modelizing the Reference System Enables Proactive Estimation

From observation → to estimation → to anticipation.



**Fig 9:** Attack estimation lifecycle

# Machine Learning Pipeline in the Digital Twin

Training the model safely, applying it reliably.

## Training Phase (Offline)


- Data: validated logs, attack simulations, side-channel measurements
- **Goal:** learn decision boundaries via *backpropagation*
- Outputs: trained weights → *frozen model*

## Inference Phase (Online)

- Data: live DT data stream
- **Goal:** detect & estimate attacks using forward pass only
- No backpropagation, model is read-only

# Preventing Model Contamination

Only validated data feeds training, never online events



No learning from  
live attack data


# Preventing Model Contamination

Only validated data feeds training, never online events

No online backpropagation, good to avoid poisoning, but no update over time?


# Forecasting Mode: Testing Without Learning

Use the trained model to simulate and estimate risks.




# Continuous Learning from Validated Events

Use confirmed incidents to update the model offline.



# Dual-Pipeline Learning: Safe Adaptation and Reliable Prediction

Use the trained model to simulate and estimate risks.



- Training (backpropagation) happens offline on validated data.
- Inference (forward pass) happens online, no learning.
- Events can later enrich the training dataset *after validation*.
- This ensures robustness, traceability, and resistance to data poisoning.

**Fig 10:** Dual ML Pipeline



# Future work

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
# Toward Predictive Digital Twins for Cyber-Physical Security

## Integrating Physical Parameters for Attack Detection

**Expand observability:** Incorporate measurable physical indicators into the Digital Twin.

**Enhance estimation:** Use these parameters to improve attack precision, anticipate consequences, and localize anomalies.


**Validate prediction:** Evaluate how added physical features affect accuracy and detection latency across datasets and testbeds.



**Fig 10:** Hardware parameters

# Ensuring Continuous Trust in the ML Pipeline

Automated validation and regression testing for DT-based ML.





# Challenges

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# Key Challenges: Data and Knowledge

High-quality, multi-domain data remains the main bottleneck.


| Aspect                                                                                          | Label                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
|  Database      | Data realism & quality (CPS + side-channel) |
|  Sources      | Diversity & representativeness              |
|  Correlation | Link physical and logical worlds            |
|  Precision   | Benchmarking & validation                   |

Multi-domain, synchronized datasets are the foundation but remain scarce.

# Key Challenges: Modele usage

## Model validation

Computational cost  
& Generability



- Validating DT behavior vs. real system is complex.  $\Rightarrow$  How to modelize the comportment of the reference system? Physical equation, correlation, ...
- ML trained on one DT may fail in another due to parameter shifts.






# Summary

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# My presentation in a Nutshell



### Integrating Physical Parameters for Attack Detection

- Expand observability:** Incorporate measurable physical indicators into the Digital Twin.
- Enhance estimation:** Use these parameters to improve attack precision, anticipate consequences, and localize anomalies.
- Validate prediction:** Evaluate how added physical features affect accuracy and detection latency across datasets and testbeds.

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# References

- [1] Varghese, S. A., Dehlaghi Ghadim, A., Balador, A., Alimadadi, Z., & Papadimitratos, P. (2022). Digital Twin-based Intrusion Detection for Industrial Control Systems. *2022 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops and other Affiliated Events (PerCom Workshops)*, 611-617. <https://doi.org/10.1109/PerComWorkshops53856.2022.9767492>
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